An Opportunity Cost Model of Subjective Effort and Task Performance by Kurzban, Robert et al.
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Departmental Papers (Psychology) Department of Psychology
12-2013





University of Pennsylvania, duckwort@psych.upenn.edu
Joseph W. Kable
University of Pennsylvania, kable@psych.upenn.edu
Justus Myers
University of Pennsylvania
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/psychology_papers
Part of the Psychology Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/psychology_papers/11
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kurzban, R., Duckworth, A., Kable, J. W., & Myers, J. (2013). An Opportunity Cost Model of Subjective Effort and Task Performance.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 36 (6), 661-679. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X12003196
An Opportunity Cost Model of Subjective Effort and Task Performance
Abstract
Why does performing certain tasks cause the aversive experience of mental effort and concomitant
deterioration in task performance? One explanation posits a physical resource that is depleted over time. We
propose an alternative explanation that centers on mental representations of the costs and benefits associated
with task performance. Specifically, certain computational mechanisms, especially those associated with
executive function, can be deployed for only a limited number of simultaneous tasks at any given moment.
Consequently, the deployment of these computational mechanisms carries an opportunity cost – that is, the
next-best use to which these systems might be put. We argue that the phenomenology of effort can be
understood as the felt output of these cost/benefit computations. In turn, the subjective experience of effort
motivates reduced deployment of these computational mechanisms in the service of the present task. These
opportunity cost representations, then, together with other cost/benefit calculations, determine effort
expended and, everything else equal, result in performance reductions. In making our case for this position,
we review alternative explanations for both the phenomenology of effort associated with these tasks and for
performance reductions over time. Likewise, we review the broad range of relevant empirical results from
across sub-disciplines, especially psychology and neuroscience. We hope that our proposal will help to build
links among the diverse fields that have been addressing similar questions from different perspectives, and we
emphasize ways in which alternative models might be empirically distinguished.
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Abstract
Why does performing certain tasks cause the aversive experience of mental effort and concomitant
deterioration in task performance? One explanation posits a physical resource that is depleted over
time. We propose an alternate explanation that centers on mental representations of the costs and
benefits associated with task performance. Specifically, certain computational mechanisms,
especially those associated with executive function, can be deployed for only a limited number of
simultaneous tasks at any given moment. Consequently, the deployment of these computational
mechanisms carries an opportunity cost – that is, the next-best use to which these systems might
be put. We argue that the phenomenology of effort can be understood as the felt output of these
cost/benefit computations. In turn, the subjective experience of effort motivates reduced
deployment of these computational mechanisms in the service of the present task. These
opportunity cost representations, then, together with other cost/benefit calculations, determine
effort expended and, everything else equal, result in performance reductions. In making our case
for this position, we review alternate explanations both for the phenomenology of effort associated
with these tasks and for performance reductions over time. Likewise, we review the broad range of
relevant empirical results from across subdisciplines, especially psychology and neuroscience. We
hope that our proposal will help to build links among the diverse fields that have been addressing
similar questions from different perspectives, and we emphasize ways in which alternate models
might be empirically distinguished.
Keywords
evolutionary psychology; mental effort; neuroeconomics; phenomenology; self-control
I have no expectation that the laws of mental fatigue will be formulated in the
immediate future.
— Dodge (1917, p. 89)
Remarkably, given that fatigue has been studied formally for well over 100 years,
there is still no scientifically mature theory of its origins and functions.
— Hockey (2011, p. 167)
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For some of the brain’s functions, such as the regulation of body temperature and heart rate,
performance is maintained without noticeable impairment over time. Similarly, the visual
system executes its functions, from the retina to V1 to object recognition systems, and so on,
more or less continuously during waking hours. The operation of these systems carries no
phenomenology of effort, and performance reductions, if any, are slight. These observations
imply that at least some of the brain’s functions can continue over sustained periods with
minimal reduction in performance and without any conscious sensation of effort. In contrast,
other mental tasks (e.g., scanning a display for infrequent, subtle signals; doing mental
arithmetic, etc.) give rise to the conscious sensation of effort and seem difficult to execute
continuously over time (Ackerman 2011).
Why are some, but not all, mental operations performed without the sensation of effort and
without performance loss? Our goal here is to sketch a computational explanation for both
the subjective phenomenology of mental effort and the associated behavioral performance
reductions. Our interest ranges broadly, from tasks such as the Stroop (Webb & Sheeran
2003) to math problems (Arai 1912) and complex decision making (Masicampo &
Baumeister 2008; Vohs et al. 2008). We propose that both phenomenology and performance
in these mental tasks rest on a common foundation: computations of their benefits and costs
relative to other operations to which the same processes might be applied. Subjective effort,
on this view, is the conscious, experienced measurement of the cost – especially the
opportunity cost – of continuing the task. The subjective experience of mental effort, which
is generally aversive, in turn motivates reallocation of computational processes to relatively
more valuable tasks. Our explanation contrasts with proposals that attribute performance
reductions to depletion of a resource or to “willpower” (e.g., Gailliot & Baumeister 2007).
1.1. Phenomena to be explained
In one of the earliest studies of mental effort, Arai (1912) practiced multiplying pairs of
four-digit numbers in her head until, after several months, she had reached a plateau in
performance. She then completed a 4-day marathon of solving multiplication problems
continuously, 12 hours per day, observing that it took her longer to solve problems over each
successive day’s session and concluding that “difficult and disagreeable continued work
brings about a decrease in the efficiency of the function exercised” (p. 114). Huxtable et al.
(1946) replicated Arai’s experiment with three graduate student participants. Performance
decrements over the course of each day were measurable but slight in magnitude and not as
consistent as participants’ reports of extreme weariness, restlessness, and boredom. In
retrospect, one participant commented that she “[w]ould not repeat these 4 days for
$10,000” (p. 52).
1.1.1. Within-task performance reductions and associated phenomenology—
More recently, performance in “vigilance tasks,” which require monitoring visual displays
or auditory streams for infrequent signals (e.g., Mackworth 1948), has been shown to
reliably decrease over time, with concomitant increases in perceived mental effort (Scerbo
2001; Warm et al. 2008). Likewise, after long periods of time in flight simulators, pilots are
more easily distracted by noncritical signals and less able to detect critical signals (Warm et
al. 2008). Ratings of boredom in vigilance tasks increase rapidly above pre-task levels
typically (Scerbo & Holcomb 1993), but the increase in boredom can be delayed by minor
variations in task parameters, such as increasing stimulus variety (Scerbo 2001).
Performance reductions have also been observed in a variety of other tasks that require
sustained attention – for example, in “flanker’ tasks, in which subjects are asked to respond
to a central target stimulus (e.g., by indicating the direction of an arrow) while ignoring
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adjacent stimuli with incongruent information (e.g., arrows that point in directions opposite
from the target arrow) that are making the task more difficult. In one version of the task,
where the central target is a letter and flanking stimuli are other letters, performance
generally worsens after 90 min. (Lorist et al. 2005). Likewise, performance (as measured by
reaction time and accuracy) decreases over time in “task-switching” paradigms, in which
subjects are asked to respond to different features of the stimulus (e.g., the color, the size)
depending on the trial (Lorist et al. 2000). Similarly, in a data entry task intended to induce
fatigue, Healy et al. (2004) found that accuracy declined over time.
Broadly, tasks that engage executive functions show performance decrements over time
(Holding 1983; van der Linden et al. 2003). Notably, rewards improve performance in
executive function tasks (e.g., Krebs et al. 2010), suggesting that performance reductions are
not mandatory, as one might expect if reductions were due to processes akin to mechanical
breakdowns.
1.1.2. Between-task performance reductions and associated phenomenology
—A separate experimental literature shows that performance reductions also occur when
subjects perform two different tasks in sequence. In a typical experiment, subjects in the
experimental condition are asked to perform a first task (sometimes referred to as the
“depleting” task, although so naming the task prejudges the issue) that is assumed to require
volitional control of attention, emotion, behavior, or cognition, and immediately thereafter, a
second task (sometimes referred to as the “dependent” task) that is assumed to require
volitional control in a different domain. Subjects in the control condition typically perform
an “easy” version of the experimental first task and the same dependent task as the
experimental group. This dual-task paradigm (Baumeister et al. 1998) is generally used to
test the prediction that performing the so-called depleting task will reduce performance on
the second.
A recent meta-analysis by Hagger et al. (2010a) identified 83 published experimental studies
that included 198 independent tests of this effect. The overall effect size for performance
impairment in the dependent task as a function of condition was medium-to-large (d=0.62,
p<.001), with substantial heterogeneity across studies (I2=35%). The same meta-analysis
found that in such studies, participants rate the experimental task as more demanding than
the control task, with medium-to-large effect sizes on self-reported effort (d=0.64),
perceived difficulty (d=0.94), and self-reported fatigue (d=0.44) (Hagger et al. 2010a). In
contrast, other dimensions of subjective experience, including positive affect (d=−0.03) and
negative affect (d=0.14), are minimally changed in such experiments (Hagger et al. 2010a).
As with within-task studies, manipulating participants’ motivation (e.g., providing
incentives for performance) can attenuate or eliminate performance decrements in dual-task
studies. Hagger et al. (2010a) found that in three studies comprising 10 independent tests of
the effect of motivational strategies on performance in dual-task experiments, the effect size
for the interaction was d=1.05.
1.2. Outline
To explain the above patterns surrounding the phenomenology of effort and concomitant
reductions in task performance, we proceed as follows: In the first part of section 2, we
describe key assumptions underlying our model: that the mechanisms that comprise the
mind have evolved functions, that some version of the computational theory of mind is true,
and that subjective experience can be understood as functioning to motivate adaptive
behavior.
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Next we describe the adaptive problem of simultaneity and its general solution,
prioritization. We argue that certain mental processes can be flexibly deployed to multiple
purposes – but not all at the same time. Choosing to do one thing with such a mental process
necessarily requires choosing not to do another, and making such trade-offs optimally entails
prioritizing options of greatest net value. We propose that the conscious experience of
mental effort indexes opportunity costs, motivating the reallocation of computational
processes toward the best alternative. We also link our account with similar, previous
proposals.
In section 3, we discuss alternate accounts for both the phenomenology of effort and
reductions in task performance, highlighting some potential difficulties with these models
and articulating predictions that follow from our account that diverge from those made by
alternate accounts. In section 4, we review empirical findings from neuroscience, especially
regarding brain metabolism and representations of value, which collectively raise doubts
about alternate explanations but are consistent with our view.
The final section summarizes and concludes.
2. Our model: Mental effort as opportunity cost computation
2.1. Assumptions
Our argument rests on three basic assumptions. First, we assume the brain is functionally
organized to generate adaptive behavior. Because evolution by natural selection is the only
known natural explanation for complex functional organization, we assume that all aspects
of biological design, including the human brain, have an explanation in terms of evolved
function (Pinker 1997; Tooby & Cosmides 1992). We note that this assumption does not
commit us to the view that all behavior is adaptive (Symons 1992), to the position that all
traits are adaptations, or to the view that the mind is optimally designed. Among other
reasons, systems designed for ancestral environments can have positive or negative effects
in modern environments, because our contemporary circumstances differ in any number of
ways from those of our evolutionary ancestors (Burnham & Phelan 2000). Likewise, an
adaptation that promotes functional behavior in most situations can in certain situations
generate dysfunctional behavior.
Second, we assume that some version of the computational theory of mind is true (see
Pinker 1997). That is, we embrace the view that the mind is an information-processing
system. Understanding these computations – including the functions they serve and the
details of the way the brain implements these functions – is required for explaining behavior.
Third, we assume that subjective experience can be understood computationally as
motivating the organism to behave adaptively (Lazarus 1993; Tooby et al. 2008). We reject
the view, occasionally referred to as “naïve realism,” that the external (or internal) world is
directly and veridically experienced (Brain 1951). Instead, we suggest that qualia are the
experiential component of computational outputs or measurements, information that serves a
function in the context of decision making (Damasio 1999). For example, the emotion of
jealousy can be understood as indexing the potential loss of a valued relationship,
motivating actions to reduce the likelihood of such loss (Buss et al. 1992). Another example
is the sensation of hunger. Hunger is a mental representation of the body’s current caloric
needs, integrating signals from organs in the periphery and the stomach, and, in virtue of
those needs, the present marginal value of eating. This computation gives rise to the
conscious sensation we label “hunger,” motivating appropriate behavior toward food. (For
two excellent reviews, see Barsh & Schwartz [2002] and Grill & Kaplan [2002].)
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Because we take these three ideas to be our assumptions, we do not defend them here.
Instead, we draw on them to consider the puzzle of mental effort. Specifically, given that
many tasks associated with feelings of mental effort seem to have good outcomes – working
hard yields professional success, resisting chocolate leads to good health – one might have
supposed that engaging in such tasks would generate positive, rather than negative,
sensations. Why, if revising a manuscript contributes to the achievement of key long-term
goals, does it feel aversively “effortful”? What might the sensation of effort be measuring,
and what adaptive outcomes might it be designed to bring about?
2.2. Adaptive problem: Simultaneity
In this section, we sketch the basics of our model. Following the usual process in
adaptationist analysis (Williams 1966), we begin by specifying the adaptive problem that we
believe the computational mechanisms in question might be designed to solve (Tooby &
Cosmides 1992). We then address the computations, along with inputs and outputs, that
might be able to solve the problem we identify (see also Marr 1982; Pinker 1997).
Subsequent to this analysis, we review the existing data and how our proposal might explain
previous results.
At the most general level, the adaptive problem we believe to be at stake here is the problem
of simultaneity – not everything can be done at once – and the concomitant solution of
prioritization – that is, choosing what to do at the expense of other options. In the context of
behavior, one cannot work toward multiple goals at the same time to the extent that there are
incompatibilities in reaching those goals.
Simultaneity is a problem that confronts any system designed to accomplish multiple goals.
In the mechanical (as opposed to computational) domain, the problem is clear in cases such
as ducking versus jumping. Doing one precludes the other. We hasten to add that some goals
can be advanced simultaneously. For instance, fleeing from a predator might well
accomplish an immediate survival goal, and at the same time have beneficial effects on
cardiovascular health. The problems of simultaneity and prioritization depend on the tasks in
question and the processes required for their execution.
2.3. General solution: Prioritization
The solution to the problem of simultaneity is prioritization. For example, with a sprained
ankle, prioritizing rest is sensible when there is no pressing need, such as escaping the
presence of a predator. But if a predator is present, the cost/benefit computations change,
and resting the ankle (reducing the chance of continued damage) is less important than is
using it to flee. Decision making in this respect is in part driven by a weighing of the
motivational outputs – the pain of putting weight on the ankle set against the fear of a
predator, which motivates fleeing.
The problem of prioritization exists for mental operations, as well. The mind accomplishes
many tasks at the same time because there are a large number of mechanisms that act in
parallel (Alexander & Crutcher 1990; Evans 2008; Fodor 1983; Minsky 1985; Nassi &
Callaway 2009; Rousselet et al. 2002; Rummelhart et al. 1986; Sigman & Dehaene 2008;
Sperber 1994). To the extent that two different tasks require the same computational
mechanisms, they cannot both be accomplished simultaneously with uncompromised
effectiveness. Consider decisions about where to direct one’s gaze. The rich, high-resolution
perceptual apparatus in the fovea is finite, and it cannot be used at the same time for the
entire visual field. The eyes must be directed somewhere, and foveating one part of the
world necessarily precludes foveating other parts of the visual scene. The fovea and the
computational apparatus downstream of it cannot simultaneously be applied to everything.
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Working memory is similarly constrained in a way that mirrors the deployment of the fovea.
A limited number of data structures can be actively maintained in working memory at any
given time (Evans 2008; Miller 1956; Miller & Cohen 2001), leading naturally to the
necessity of decisions about what gets maintained. Given the problem of simultaneity, a
means is needed to evaluate the value of using computational systems such as working
memory for mutually exclusive tasks. To return to the example above, attending to what is
in the visual array might reduce processing of information in the auditory stream. Limited
attention, in this sense, can be thought of as a trade-off in extracting information between
these two information channels.
These considerations locate the solution to the adaptive problem of simultaneity in
prioritizing among possible computations – that is, identifying which of the possible actions
or computations ought to be performed. In turn, solving the problem of prioritization, very
generally, requires the assignment of costs and benefits to candidate options. In the context
of computations, this means, of course, computing the costs and benefits of candidate
computations and then comparing these.
A computational challenge for making these trade-offs is that costs and benefits come in
many different currencies. From a functional standpoint, the value of an act depended on its
eventual net contribution to fitness. Computational mechanisms, of course, cannot directly
compute fitness outcomes, so they must use proxy variables, evaluating the benefits of
possibilities in terms of local variables (Symons 1992). That is, the design of these
mechanisms can be understood in the context of evolutionary selection for systems that
assigned weights in a way that maximized reproductive success (Glimcher 2003).
2.3.1. Specific solution: Prioritization using opportunity costs—The problem of
simultaneity is illustrated by foraging organisms, which can feed in only one patch at any
given time and, therefore, must decide when to stay in their current patch and when to leave
it in search of a new one (Charnov 1976). Feeding at the current patch carries opportunity
costs – that is, the value of the next-best alternative to the current choice. When foraging
organisms change location, they do so because the rate of return falls below some threshold
(Gallistel 1990); for instance, the running average rate of return of foraging in similar
patches. To implement this, the mind of the organism contains counters, of sorts, that
monitor benefits over time (Gallistel 1990).
For the present model, we propose that the allocation of mental processes to a task carries
opportunity costs equal to the value of the next-best use of those mental processes. For
example, the Stroop task engages the visual system and word recognition systems, among
other mechanisms. It might not be possible to simultaneously perform other tasks that
require one or more of the same systems. Similarly, working memory, we presume, cannot
simultaneously be used for two different tasks that require it. Computations to prioritize its
use must be made, and the analysis is identical to the analysis for behavioral options.
Therefore, in the context of tasks such as the Stroop, the costs of performing the task X
include the potential benefits of doing those other tasks (A, B, C, etc.) being precluded
because the systems required for the task X cannot be used for alternatives A, B, or C.
Performing any given task carries opportunity costs, and the size of these opportunity costs
depends on the details of the systems recruited by the task. To the extent that a task recruits
many systems, particularly those systems that are required for a large number of other tasks,
it carries a large opportunity cost.
2.3.2. Phenomenology of perceived opportunity cost—Above we argued that
phenomenology can be understood as the felt or experienced output of motivational systems,
directing behavior toward net-positive fitness outcomes and away from net-negative fitness
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outcomes. We argued that felt sensations are the outputs of mechanisms designed to produce
inputs to decision-making systems. This view resonates with other approaches to
phenomenology (Bloom 2010; Thornhill 1998). Positive experiences in the domains of food
(Rozin & Vollmecke 1986); environments (Orians & Heerwagen 1992); bodies (Buss 1989;
Singh 1993); the arts (Kurzban 2007; 2012); and, of course, emotions (Tooby et al. 2008)
can all be neatly explained in this way.
Using the same logic, and similar to recent proposals (Boksem et al. 2005; Boksem & Tops
2008; Botvinick 2007; Hockey 2011; Kool et al. 2010; Lorist et al. 2005), the crux of our
argument is that the sensation of “mental effort” is the output of mechanisms designed to
measure the opportunity costs of engaging in the current mental task (Kurzban 2010b; see
Fig. 1). The function of these cost representations is to direct the reallocation of particular
computational mechanisms away from the present task and toward the task that yields
greater benefits.
Our view resembles that of Kool et al. (2010), who proposed “that cognitive demand weighs
as a cost in the cost/benefit analyses underlying decision making (p. 677).” Similarly,
Hockey (2011) suggested that fatigue is “an adaptive state that signals a growing conflict in
control activity between what is being done and what else might be done” (p. 168).
Hockey’s (2011) model similarly posits an “effort monitor,” which functions to evaluate the
value of pursuing the current goal relative to alternate goals: “Maintaining a specific
cognitive goal means suppressing all others (investigating novel environmental events,
attending to emerging thoughts, making a phone call, replying to an email). It is argued that
the fatigue state has a metacognitive function, interrupting the currently active goal and
allowing others into contention” (p. 173). In the same vein, van der Linden (2011) has
suggested that “fatigue might be considered as a stop emotion” (p. 153, italics original), an
idea proposed more than a century earlier by Thorndike: “Feelings of fatigue … serve as a
sign to us to stop working long before our actual ability to work has suffered any important
decrease” (quoted in Arai 1912, pp. 72–73).
Our model explains the well-documented experiences of boredom and mental effort
associated with vigilance tasks. Performing such tasks requires deploying attention to the
stimulus object. Monitoring the Mackworth Clock, for example, requires computations to
determine whether the movement of the clock corresponds to the motion specified by task
instructions, which presumably recruits working memory and other systems, which therefore
cannot otherwise be engaged. To the extent that there are no offsetting benefits – other than,
for example, compliance with experimenter requests to persist – the relationship between
perceived costs and benefits can become less favorable over time, just as in the foraging
example offered above.
We can also apply this idea to the experimental psychology literature on “self-control”
(Baumeister et al. 2007). The tasks used in this literature – making complex choices (as
opposed to simply remembering), keeping an instruction in working memory (e.g., “Do not
think of a white bear”), inhibiting prepotent responses, math problems, and so on – all
require systems that have many possible uses (Miller & Cohen 2001; Miyake et al. 2000;
Stuss & Alexander 2000). As in the case of the vigilance tasks, we believe that it is useful to
conceptualize executing self-control tasks as carrying the opportunity costs associated with
these systems, and the phenomenon of effort to be the felt output of a motivational system
designed to optimize the deployment of computations that cannot be used simultaneously,
especially those associated with executive function.
In sum, many experiences, particularly the more or less unpleasant sensations discussed here
(i.e., effort, boredom, fatigue), can be profitably thought of as resulting from (1) monitoring
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mechanisms that tally opportunity costs, which (2) cause an aversive state that corresponds
in magnitude to the cost computed, which (3) enters into decision making, acting as a kind
of a “vote,” influencing the decision ultimately taken.
2.4. Simple formal model
Here we sketch a formal model of our proposal to explain how our theory can account for
the perception of effort, corresponding performance decrements, and the dynamics of both
of these. Developing more detailed computational models that make quantitative predictions
in specific tasks should be a critical aim of future research, but it goes beyond our current
goal.
We start with the assumption that organisms solve the prioritization problem by estimating
the utilities of different possible actions, and then selecting the action that has maximal
expected utility. (See sect. 4.2 for neural evidence supporting this assumption.) We therefore
start with the standard assumptions of rational choice, applying this logic to prioritizing
mental actions. These assumptions are analogous to the approach in psychophysics, in which
value maximization is (likely) the “ideal observer” solution for trade-off and prioritization
problems. This makes it a natural starting point for thinking about the computations
involved in solving trade-off and prioritization problems from a functional point of view. Of
course, as is often the case in psychophysics (and elsewhere), cognitive mechanisms might
only approximate the ideal observer solution.
2.4.1. An illustrative example—Consider, as an illustrative example, a research
participant asked to perform a set of simple math calculations of the sort Arai (1912) and
Huxtable et al. (1946) investigated. We can think of this participant as having a choice
between performing those calculations or, alternately, daydreaming (and therefore not
performing the problems). Performing the math calculations leads to various benefits in
different currencies (e.g., monetary, class credit, social approval). Daydreaming’s benefits
are more difficult to identify but may include reflection upon past experience and scenario
planning for the future (Gilbert & Wilson 2007). The costs of these mental activities are
simply their opportunity costs. In situations such as these, the opportunity cost of a chosen
action is the value of the next-best possible action. Therefore, the opportunity costs of doing
the math calculations are the forgone benefits of daydreaming.
(Note that we offer daydreaming as only one example of the kinds of “background”
processes that one’s brain could engage in. Others might be planning future activities,
reevaluating past actions, scanning the environment, etc.)
Suppose that we add a third possible action for our research participant. Sitting next to him
(or her) is his smartphone, which he could use to check his email, log into Facebook, check
sports scores, and so on. We assume that people are motivated to do these activities because
they derive from them lots of valuable social information (e.g., who is trying to get in touch
with them, who likes their latest status update, whether their team is winning the soccer
match, etc.); but in this context, smartphone activities carry the potential cost of social
disapproval from the experimenter. So let us assume that in the experimental context,
playing with the smartphone is more valuable than daydreaming but less valuable than doing
the experiment. Further, we will assume that we can attach a single number to each activity
that is proportional to its expected utility (U). (See Fig. 2.)
With the smartphone available, the opportunity costs of doing the math problems are now
greater, since the forgone benefits of using the smartphone are greater than those of
daydreaming. Our model predicts that doing the math problems in the presence of the
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smartphone will be perceived as more effortful than when the smartphone was absent,
because the opportunity cost now is higher.
Perception of mental effort might correspond to different specific computational parameters,
including (in the smartphone example) the opportunity cost of the current action (6), the
ratio of that opportunity cost to the utility of the current action (6/10=0.6), or the difference
between the two actions (10–6=4). We do not take a position here on exactly which of these
most closely corresponds to the perception of mental effort, but we believe that this question
could be answered empirically.
Experiencing mental effort does not always result in ceasing the current activity, and in the
above example the participant should continue to do the (now more effortful) math
problems. In some cases, though, the experience of mental effort precedes abandoning a task
altogether. Returning to our example, imagine the experimenter leaves the room, changing
the calculus of benefits for doing the experimental task (social disapproval for shirking is
now less of an issue), as shown in Figure 3:
The person doing math problems in this example should then cease this activity and shift to
playing with their smartphone.
2.4.2. Allocating computational processes—The foregoing assumes that only one
task at a time can be executed. In this section, we assume that the critical computational
processes necessary for task performance can be divided among multiple tasks, that these
processes can be allocated in different portions to different tasks, and that task performance
varies with the degree to which computational processes are allocated to the task. We stress
that in this view, mental “resources” are finite, dynamic, and divisible at any given point in
time, rather than finite and depletable over time. A good analogy would be a computer with
multiple processors that are dynamically allocated to computational tasks; the brain similarly
has a finite number of mental “processors” that can be allocated to different tasks.
To see how these additional assumptions can explain decrements in task performance,
consider again the math problems. Take the simplest possible case, in which there are just
two mental processors and two possible activities (task 1, task 2). As shown in Figure 4, the
value or utility (U) of allocating the processors to the tasks depends on how many processors
are allocated to each task:
Under the conditions shown in Figure 4, the participant with both mental processors
allocated to the math problems (U=10) should shift to having the processors divided
between doing math problems and daydreaming (U=11). If performance on math problems
varies monotonically with the number of mental processors dedicated to a task, which is a
likely assumption, then such a shift would result in decreased performance.
In this simplified case, dividing processors between two mental tasks should occur only if
the marginal utility gained by reallocating one processor’s capacity to the next-best task is
greater than the marginal utility lost by reallocating one processor from the best task to the
next-best one.
To illustrate this with a simple mathematical example, consider the case where a person can
focus on only one task or perform two tasks at once, when doing two tasks simultaneously
achieves a fixed fraction (β) of the utility of doing each task in isolation:
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where a1 and a2 are two tasks; U(a1,a1) is the value gained from doing only task a1;
U(a2,a2) is the value gained from doing only task a2; and U(a1,a2) is that value gained from
doing tasks a1 and a2 at the same time. β is an index of diminishing marginal utility, where 1
≥ β ≥ 0. When β is high (near 1), the person already receives most of the possible value from
a task under conditions where processing capacity is simultaneously divided between two
tasks.
We can define the relative utility (RU) of the next-best action (a2) as the fraction of its utility
relative to the utility of the best action (a1),
The conditions under which a person should do both tasks simultaneously is expressed thus:
Figure 5 shows the parameters under which the person should divide processing capacity
between two actions rather than devote processing capacity exclusively to the highest-valued
action. This occurs when the relative utility of the next-best action (RU(a2)) is high, and
when there is diminishing marginal utility to devoting processing capacity entirely to one
task relative to dividing it between two tasks (β is high). These two parameters control the
opportunity cost of devoting processing capacity exclusively to the most valuable task.
When the marginal value gained from the best task by dedicating processing capacity
entirely to it is less than the marginal value gained from the next-best task by dividing
processing capacity, processing capacity should be divided between the two tasks.
Our examples above are clearly simplifications, but these examples have been intended to be
illustrative only. Microeconomic models could provide a much richer framework to model
these kinds of effects, one that does not depend on restrictive assumptions such as the utility
from a task being directly proportional to performance, or the utility functions of the two
tasks being similar in form. This richer framework would involve “production functions”
that describe performance on multiple tasks as a function of the number of processors
allocated to them, and “utility functions” that describe one’s preferences over performance
levels on the different tasks. Such a framework was already offered some time ago, as an
alternative to resource theories of attention (Navon 1984). Our hope here is that such a
framework will gain greater traction in the field if reintroduced.
2.4.3. Dynamics of effort and performance—Empirically, cumulative time on task
has been found to be the best predictor of sensations of fatigue (Kanfer 2011; see also
Boksem et al. 2006). Why are some tasks perceived as progressively more and more
effortful over time? Related, why does performance on vigilance tasks decline over time?
And, why would performance on a second task decline after having done a first task?
Our view is that a person’s experience with a task over time provides information that
updates estimates of expected utility. Figure 5 illustrates the optimal allocation between two
tasks. Dynamics arise in how one reaches that optimal allocation. For example, imagine
someone is currently devoting her (or his) entire processing capacity to one task, but would,
because she is “at” point y, in the shaded portion of Figure 5, be better off dividing her
processing capacity between the two tasks. In this case, we would expect the person to
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experience a sense of effort that would cause her to shift allocation and divide processing
capacity between the two tasks.
A situation where processing allocations are suboptimal can arise for at least two reasons.
First, the relative utility of the next-best action might be stable but the person does not know
this value with any certainty, and so he or she has to learn it over time. This situation likely
obtains anytime someone begins performing a novel task for the first time. Second, the
relative utility of the next-best action might be changing over time, such that a previously
optimal allocation is no longer optimal (as illustrated in Fig. 5 with a change from point x in
the white portion of the figure to point y in the shaded portion). Thus, our theory explains
dynamics of effort and performance as a result of learning the utilities and opportunity costs
over time, as opposed to dynamic changes in the level of a resource.
Finally, we note that a framework explaining changes in mental effort and task performance
as the result of dynamic learning processes can easily be expanded to incorporate trade-offs
between exploration and exploitation. Even when the perceived utilities of the two best tasks
are stable, it could be adaptive for there to be a small bias away from continuing to allocate
processing capacity to the same task over time, which would also contribute to decrements
in performance over time. As discussed extensively in the literature on reward learning
(Cohen et al. 2007), such an exploration bonus would trade off exploitation of knowledge
about the current task for gaining new and potentially valuable knowledge about different
tasks.
3. Comparing our model with previous models
Broadly, two types of explanations have previously been proposed for reductions in
performance in tasks that require vigilance or effort over time. One view is that information-
processing resources or capacities are dynamically allocated in response to task demands.
These resources/capacities have been conceptualized as unitary and domain-general
(Kahneman 1973; Moray 1967) or multiple and domain-specific (e.g., Gopher et al. 1982;
Navon & Gopher 1979; Wickens 2002). Some accounts have hypothesized that mental effort
and task performance decrements are caused by the literal depletion of a resource (Gailliot
& Baumeister 2007; Gailliot et al. 2007). Other accounts have located their explanation in
the notion of motivation (Boksem et al. 2006; Boksem & Tops 2008; Hockey 2011; Nix et
al. 1999; Robinson et al. 2010), positing that the repetitive, tedious nature of the task leads
observers to withdraw effort over time and instead divert attention to other tasks. Some
accounts combine these two approaches; still others draw on other computational
frameworks (Gonzalez et al. 2011; Gunzelmann et al. 2009). Although it is beyond the scope
of this article to address all alternate conceptualizations, this section describes how our
model explains existing data, and distinguishes our model from some of these previous
accounts.
Accounts of mental effort and task performance that rely on some notion of “resources” or
“capacities” use these concepts with varying degrees of specificity, falling into two broad
categories. Some accounts use the idea of resources loosely and analogically; researchers
infer from task performance outcomes that the underlying cognitive system of interest
behaves “as if” it were constrained by a limited resource, or that it has a “limited capacity”
of some sort. Less common but recently rising in prominence are limited resource accounts
in which the resource is specified. These two categories of resource/capacity accounts are
briefly described below.
The most prominent account of mental effort as a limited capacity is probably Kahneman’s
(1973) capacity model of attention. Kahneman’s account does not seek to explain the
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phenomenology of effort; rather, in his model, effort (which he refers to interchangeably as
“attention” or “capacity”) is an assumed constraint for certain kinds of tasks with particular
characteristics and therefore a constraint on task performance. The total amount of effort
that can be used at any one time is limited and is used according to an allocation policy that
changes over time based on task demands. Effort is thought to increase in response to
demands such as the relative task “difficulty,” time pressure, and especially when two tasks
are being done at the same time. In this model, effort is not literally a resource; instead, it is
dynamic (allocated in response to changing task demands) but is not depletable. In this sense
it is similar to models of attention that preceded it, most notably Moray’s (1967) model of
attention, and also to later models of working memory (e.g., Baddeley & Hitch 1974; Posner
& Snyder 1975; Posner et al. 1980).
Whereas Kahneman’s (1973) model of effort relied on a unitary and limited capacity (see
also Moray 1967; Rolfe 1971), other models posit multiple capacities or resources. For
example, Navon and Gopher (1979) proposed a model of multiple capacity usage analogous
to the production of a firm, whereby performance on two simultaneous tasks depends on
trade-offs resulting from shared inputs, the degree of demands on those inputs, and the
chosen allocation policy (see also Gopher et al. 1982; Gopher & Navon 1980). In their
model and other multiple capacity models (e.g., Wickens 2002), the putative resources are
dynamic but, as in Kahneman’s (1973) model of effort, not depletable.
Other accounts that attempt to explain diminished task performance (and secondarily mental
effort) use the idea of resources literally. Perhaps the most prominent nonmotivational
account for explaining the sorts of effects we are interested here is the “ego depletion”
model, found in the psychology literature on self-control. Tasks in this literature are similar
to vigilance tasks (e.g., Davies & Parasuraman 1982; Head 1923; Mackworth 1948; Warm
1984; Warm et al. 2008), showing reductions in performance over time and giving rise to the
phenomenology of effort. The principal focus is on performance reductions; measurement of
subjective effort is typically used as a manipulation check (e.g., Muraven et al. 1998). This
account suggests that performance on these tasks relies on a resource that can be depleted
and has spawned a tremendous amount of research (recently reviewed by Hagger et al.
[2010b]), and arguably represents the most influential model of diminished task
performance after a putatively “difficult” task in the psychological literature. More recently,
researchers in this tradition have attempted to specify the resource that is depleted and that
leads to subsequent performance decrements (Gailliot & Baumeister 2007; Gailliot et al.
2007).
Numerous other accounts of mental effort and task performance rely on some notion of
“motivation.” Although the term can be vague (see Niv et al. [2006] for a useful discussion),
we believe that motivation has a role to play in explaining mental effort. (See especially
Berridge [2004] for a thorough and useful discussion of motivation.) Indeed, previous
models have linked costs and benefits with the notion of motivation. Among these models,
the view that most closely resembles our own is Hockey’s (2011) “motivational control
theory of mental fatigue.” Hockey suggests that the feeling of mental effort is a signal that
functions to cause goal switching in humans. A rapidly growing literature echoes this focus
on the adaptive nature of mental effort, whereby the expected costs and benefits motivate
behavior toward more rewarding activities and away from less rewarding ones (e.g., Boksem
et al. 2005; 2006; Boksem & Tops 2008; Kool et al. 2010; Kurniawan et al. 2011).
3.1. How the opportunity cost account explains existing data
As discussed above, our view bears a resemblance to proposals that explain reductions in
performance as due to motivation. However, our view of motivation is a particular one and
committed to the idea that the “motivation” to devote computational processes or attention
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to a task depends on the history of costs and benefits of executing the task. Our proposal
also goes beyond previous motivational theories in not just specifying that mental activity is
costly, but also identifying the source of the cost – namely, that engaging computational
processes or attention on a task entails opportunity costs. Because our proposal relies on the
computation of the relative costs and benefits of persisting on a given task, and so commits
to a representation of value, we refer to our account as an opportunity cost model. Our view
resonates with models such as the “sociometer” model of self-esteem, which suggests that
self-esteem can be thought of as a measure of one’s value to others (Kirkpatrick & Ellis
2001; Kirkpatrick et al. 2002; Leary & Baumeister 2000; Leary et al. 1995).
Specifically, in the context of the Mackworth Clock task, our view is that when subjects
comply with experimenter requests to attend to the task, the costs of doing so are
represented – specifically the opportunity costs of the computational systems required for
the task. In vigilance tasks, targets are rare. As a person gains more and more experience
with the task, their estimate of the probability of a target, and therefore the expected benefit
of fully attending to the task, declines. (Note that this explanation predicts that vigilance
should increase right after a target occurs; other reinforcing stimuli should have similar
effects.) With learning, the representations of costs grow with time on task and, absent
offsetting benefits, are experienced as the sensation of fatigue, boredom, and/or stress –
aversive subjective states, which in turn encourage disengagement with the task, and
ultimately, performance reductions. In short, we would explain vigilance decrements with
reference to subjects’ learning (implicitly or explicitly) about the value of devoting attention
to the vigilance task versus dividing attention between the task and mind wandering (Gilbert
& Wilson 2007).
Similarly, our account suggests that the difference between the consistent Stroop and the
inconsistent Stroop is that the inconsistent Stroop requires systems that inhibit prepotent
responses that are themselves useful for a number of other computations. The recruitment of
these (executive) systems carries opportunity costs, which in turn are experienced as effort,
eventually reducing performance.
What about performance effects in sequential paradigms, such as when one’s persistence on
unsolvable anagrams is lower after having previously completed a Stroop task? Sequential
effects can be explained by our account if there is some link between the expected utility of
the second task and the costs and benefits of having performed the first task – perhaps
because the two tasks are similar in some way, or maybe just by the virtue of both tasks
being part of the same social interaction.
Feelings of mental effort are limited when extrinsic incentives are sufficiently high (Boksem
et al. 2006; Lorist et al. 2005; Tops et al. 2004). Similarly, when a second self-control task is
perceived as sufficiently important (e.g., it leads to money, it may help others or oneself),
prior engagement with a first, “depleting” task has no effect on performance or perseverance
(e.g., Muraven & Slessareva 2003). Because it is unclear what sort of a “resource” might be
restored when the subject is paid or otherwise incentivized (see below), these effects point to
a motivational account for explaining the results of studies in the self-control literature.
We propose, in short, that the phenomenology of effort is attenuated if one experiences
reward of various forms. This is necessarily the other half of the cost/benefit equation.
Activities will seem less aversive, and therefore allow persistence, to the extent that benefits
of various forms are received. These predictions already have some support (see sect. 3.3.2).
In this framework, beliefs and perceptions can lead to increases in task performance, again
through learning. For example, this is how our theory would explain increased effort at
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resisting smoking at time 2 after having successfully resisted smoking at time 1 (O’Connell
et al. 2008); the first successful effort likely increases one’s belief that subsequent efforts
will also be successful.
Costs, of course, also matter. Consider that when subjects participate in laboratory
experiments, they are doing so, generally, because they are receiving compensation in the
form of either partial course credit or monetary payment. Hence, experimental sessions are
explicitly exchanges in which the subjects give their time (and “effort”) in exchange for
credit or cash. This explicit exchange – along with implicit norms that govern the
relationship between subjects and experimenters in such contexts (Orne 1962) – explains
why subjects comply with experimenter instructions and requests.
There are, of course, limits to what subjects will do. Subjects’ decisions to comply can be
affected by the amount of effort that is appropriate given the compensation they expect to
receive (Akerlof & Yellen 1990; Fehr et al. 2009). That is, people expend effort as a
function of what they construe as “just” or “fair” given the exchange relationship (Fehr et al.
2009). Studies have shown, for instance, that subjects are more likely to do favors having
previously received an unsolicited gift (Regan 1971); that surveys are more likely to be
completed and returned when accompanied by an up-front small payment than by the offer
of a large payment upon completion (James & Bolstein 1992); and that tips are more likely
when food servers offer customers a candy with their check (Lynn & McCall 2000).
So, to the extent experimental participants in a self-control treatment perceive themselves as
having discharged more of this obligation than those in a control treatment, participants
might be expected to expend less effort on the subsequent task. Given that “self-control”
tasks usually evoke a sense of effort, the perception of having discharged an obligation
might explain why subjects in self-control conditions exert less effort. This locates the
similarity of results across self-control tasks not in a resource but in the felt sense of effort
these tasks evoke, in concert with the construal of the experimental context as an exchange.
One challenge to this argument comes from data showing that the size of depletion effects is
not reduced by changing experimenters between the initial depleting task and the later task,
nor by presenting the two tasks as a single experiment (Hagger et al. 2010a). However, if
subjects find the self-control treatment aversive (Hagger et al. 2010a), and therefore
understand their obligation to give a certain amount of effort in exchange for the credit that
they are receiving, then they may understand their obligation to be reduced after the
expenditure of effort even if a new experimenter is encountered in a second part of an
experimental session. Indeed, consistent with this type of interpretation, DeWall et al.
(2007), for example, reported that participants behaved more aggressively after performing a
self-control task (see also Stucke & Baumeister 2006). In short, devoting attention to the
task might be represented as a cost paid to offset the benefit (e.g., course credit) they are to
receive. As they discharge more of the benefit over time, the residual they “owe” for the
hour of credit diminishes. This might help to explain task carryover effects – over time,
subjects owe less attention, and the endurance of the sensation of effort, in return for credit.
3.2. Comparison with resource accounts
The accounts that are perhaps most different from ours are resource models, in which
performance depends on a depletable resource. A version of the resource model proposed by
Baumeister and colleagues is also the most prominent explanation for performance
decrements in the self-control literature in psychology. It is therefore instructive to explicitly
consider their model and similar resource accounts in some detail.
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Muraven and Baumeister (2000) presented five assumptions of this model: (1) Self-control
“strength” is necessary for self-control. (2) Self-control strength is limited. (3) The resource
on which this strength is based is used across self-control operations. (4) Task performance
depends on one’s self-control strength (although “impulse strength,” among other factors,
might also influence performance). (5) Exerting control exhausts self-control strength. These
assumptions give rise to a family of models, depending on how performance “depends on”
the level of the resource (assumption 4), as we review below.
Note that in this literature, researchers tend to use the experimental structure described
above, in which a subject does one task that putatively requires the self-control resource,
ranging from not eating tempting brownies, to doing an inconsistent Stroop task, to showing
no emotion while watching a funny video, and so on. (Subjects who have completed such a
task are referred to as “depleted.”) Subsequently, subjects do a second task that also
putatively requires the self-control resource.
3.2.1. Theoretical assumptions of resource models—Distinguishing our model
from resource models is challenging because resource models have multiple interpretations.
On one interpretation, performance could depend on the level of a resource in a very strict
way, with the level of the resource putting an absolute upper limit on performance. As an
analogy, consider an electric pepper grinder; as the batteries get close to being drained,
operation is limited by the remaining charge. According to this model, for any given amount
of resource, there is a fixed maximum level of performance. We will refer to this as the strict
capacity model, because it holds that the causal locus of observed performance reductions is
the capacity for performance. This model carries the very strong entailment that, as a literal
and physical matter, nothing could improve the performance of depleted subjects, as in the
case of a pepper grinder with a nearly depleted battery. As Baumeister and Vohs (2007) put
it, using a reservoir analogy: “If the tank were truly and thoroughly empty, it is unlikely that
increasing incentives would counteract depletion” (p. 125). The large amount of data
showing that incentives do counteract “depletion” is strong evidence that the strict capacity
model is false (Baumeister & Vohs 2007; Baumeister et al. 2007; Muraven & Slessareva
2003).
Indeed, as Baumeister and Vohs (2007) put it: “Ego depletion effects thus indicate
conservation of a partly depleted resource, rather than full incapacity because the resource is
completely gone.” This suggests a second type of model – that the amount of the putative
resource puts, in principle, an upper (capacity) limit on self-control performance, but that
performance reductions are not a strict necessity (Muraven et al. 2006). This view suggests
that “depleted” subjects could – perhaps by virtue of changed incentives – perform without
any decrement or perform worse than controls. As an analogy, consider a soldier taking
fewer shots because she is running low on ammunition but not yet out.
The second model, then, is that “depleted” and “nondepleted” subjects are capable of equal
performance, but “depleted” subjects do not deploy self-control resources. This carries the
implication that all of the effects in this literature are due to a decision by the subjects not to
use self-control resources, rather than a limit on their capacity for self-control per se. In
other words, this model holds that the reduction in the resource is not the immediately
proximate causal variable, but only indirectly related. As Muraven et al. (2006) write, “The
moderation of depletion by motivation suggests that self-control suffers in many situations
because individuals are not unable but instead are not willing to exert sufficient self-control
to overcome the impulse” (p. 525).
This model implies that no data can be directly explained by the capacity restriction. Instead,
all the data are explained by a reduced capacity that caused a change in motivation to persist,
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and that this reduction in motivation directly caused performance reductions. A related view
is that the amount of the putative resource matters, but so too does motivation, such that the
level of the resource and motivation jointly determine self-control performance.
Muraven and Slessareva (2003), for instance, argued that their data support the view that
“depletion of self-control strength does not prevent the subsequent exertion of self-control”
(p. 897). This implies that the putative resource is not necessary for self-control, or
minimally that self-control can be exerted in the absence of some quantity of the putative
resource. The problem with such a view is that any observations of performance reduction
can be accommodated by the claim that something was depleted and resources husbanded.
Observation of continued performance can be accommodated by the view that something
was depleted but no husbanding took place. Without independent means of measuring the
resource and motivation, no data can falsify the model. This model runs into the problem
faced by resource accounts in general, as pointed out by Navon (1984), who observed that
the
frequent cases in which the predictions do not bear out are dismissed by resorting
to built-in escapes in the theory, such as, data limits, operation below full capacity,
disparate resource composition, and so forth. This is probably the source of the
self-reinforcing nature of the concept and the unfalsifiable status of the theory.” (p.
231, emphasis added)
It could be that one route to evaluating this model would be studies in which performance
was compared between “depleted” and “nondepleted” subjects, with motivation held
constant. However, because “depleting” tasks, we would argue, can affect motivation, this
design represents a methodological challenge in the absence of good tools to measure
motivation and the putative resource accurately.
Finally, a third model is that the amount of the resource that is available directly limits
performance, but that motivation can (in some way) causally influence the amount of the
resource. On this model, motivation is an antecedent variable that influences self-control
performance indirectly – that is, the order of the two causal variables is reversed as
compared with the strict husbanding model. For instance, Tice et al. (2007) showed that
when subjects performed an initial self-control task, there were no adverse effects on a
subsequent self-control task when they experienced positive affect in the intervening time
period – either from watching a funny video or receiving an unexpected gift. Tyler and
Burns (2008) found similar effects with relaxation interventions, and Schmeichel and Vohs
(2009) found similar effects with self-affirmation interventions. Tice et al. (2007) argued
that positive affect might be able to “effectively replenish the depleted resource” (p. 380).
We are uncertain what sort of mechanism might literally have this effect. We also note that
this view is inconsistent with the view that the resource is something physical (e.g., glucose;
see below).
3.2.2. Empirics of resource models—In addition to the concerns in the previous
section, there are empirical results that seem hard for resource views to accommodate.
Martijn et al. (2002) had subjects watch a brief video and had some subjects suppress their
emotional expression, a task previously shown to yield performance reductions (Muraven et
al. 1998). Martijn et al. then manipulated beliefs about self-control, telling some subjects
that the intuitive theory that self-control is a limited resource is incorrect. The dependent
measure was the difference in performance on a handgrip task before and after watching the
video. The resource model predicts no effect of such beliefs. However, people who were
given the emotion suppression manipulation but also told that the intuitive resource model of
self-control was false showed an increase in performance on the handgrip task. Along
similar lines, Job et al. (2010) recently showed that “depletion” effects depend on people’
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beliefs. Those who did not indicate agreement with the idea that energy is depleted by a
taxing mental task did not show the reduction in performance frequently observed in a two-
task design.
In addition, Converse and DeShon (2009), drawing on research on “learned industriousness”
(Eisenberger 1992), had subjects complete a perceptual task – finding differences between
two images – then a math task (for which subjects were financially incentivized to answer
correctly), and then an anagram task. One group of subjects were given perceptual and math
tasks that were more taxing than the other group’s. The more taxing tasks should lead to
performance reductions in these subjects; however, the reverse occurred: Subjects in the
more difficult condition persisted longer on the anagram task than the other group did. This
effect was replicated when different “depleting” tasks were used (and incentives in the
second task omitted).
Similarly, Dewitte et al. (2009) had subjects perform a “response reversal” task –
performing one action when they saw particular stimuli, but reversing the action when
shown those same stimuli under particular conditions. Subjects who suppressed thoughts of
a white bear subsequently performed worse on this task compared with controls, as
predicted by resource models. However, consistent with their predictions derived from
“control theory” (Miller & Cohen 2001), Dewitte et al. found that subjects who did one
response reversal task subsequently performed better than both controls and those who had
engaged in thought suppression did. Similarly, subjects who did task reversal twice
performed better the second time than the first time. (For similar results, see Eisenberger &
Masterson 1983; Hickman et al. 1998.) Such improvements are difficult for a resource
model to explain, although they could perhaps be accommodated to the extent that these
results could be attributed to practice effects.
Likewise, framing a laboratory task such as squeezing a handgrip as long as possible as a
test of a subject’s “willpower” improves performance compared with a neutral framing
(Laran & Janiszewski 2011; Magen & Gross 2007). Finally, Ackerman et al. (2009) found
that participants asked to mentally simulate the perspective of another person exerting self-
control subsequently showed less self-control themselves.
In short, the theoretical and empirical difficulties for resource accounts suggest that
alternatives, such as our proposal here, might be of value in accounting for the array of
effects in this literature.
3.3. Comparison of models and predictions
Above we discussed evidence from prior empirical studies that in our view supports an
opportunity cost model of mental effort. Here we summarize how our model’s predictions
diverge from alternate accounts of mental effort, some of which are supported by prior
studies, but most of which have yet to be directly tested.
First and foremost, whereas both our model and the resource account posit limits to mental
activity, the nature of the limitations is different. In the resource account, mental resources
are depletable: finite and destroyed with use. In our proposal, computational processes are
dynamic: finite but not destroyed with use. The resource view holds that performance
reductions result because some physical substrate in the brain (e.g., glucose) is literally
depleted during self-control tasks. In contrast, our model suggests that performance
reductions reflect the operation of a system designed to motivate disengagement with the
present task when the opportunity costs are sufficiently high. Because computational
processes are dynamically allocated rather than irreversibly (over short time spans) depleted,
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our model predicts that performance in self-control tasks might under specific circumstances
improve over time, even in the absence of practice effects.
A second distinction concerns phenomenology. We suggest that the estimation of
opportunity costs gives rise to the phenomenology of mental effort. These feelings (e.g.,
fatigue, boredom) in turn motivate the reallocation of computational processes away from a
task to alternate, higher utility activities. The phenomenology of mental effort in our view is
generally adaptive, favoring changes in behavior that are, in most circumstances, beneficial
to the individual. The resource account, in contrast, suggests that the (perception of the)
literal depletion of some substance gives rise to the phenomenology of mental effort.
Whereas subjective experience in the resource account is, hence, both veridical and
epiphenomenal, our view holds that subjective experience of effort is a representation that is
neither always veridical (insofar as estimates can be wrong) nor epiphenomenal (insofar as
feelings motivate behavior).
Third, our model specifically locates the costs of mental effort in opportunity costs. Several
prior models have suggested that the mental effort precipitates an aversive subjective
experience, which people seek to avoid. However, our model is distinct insofar as we
specify what, in particular, makes mental tasks feel effortful – namely, the expected value of
the next-best alternate use of the same computational processes. Importantly, it is not only
the costs and benefits of performing the task at hand that give rise to the phenomenology of
mental effort, but also the costs and benefits of rival activities to which the same
computational processes might otherwise be directed. Crucially, and in line with existing
data, tasks that recruit mechanisms that can be flexibly deployed should feel more effortful
and demonstrate the most precipitous declines in performance, whereas mechanisms that are
singular in their function should not. Solving four-digit multiplication problems feels “hard”
in this view, because the required computational processes could be deployed to an alternate,
profitable use (including prospection, daydreaming, and other “off-task” varieties of
mentation). Vision, which also entails substantially complex computational processing, does
not feel like anything at all, because the required computational processes are specialized for
a particular purpose and cannot be flexibly deployed to alternate tasks unrelated to vision.
We have suggested that within-individual changes in the performance of mental tasks
depend on estimates of their expected utility. Accordingly, one class of experiments useful
in distinguishing accounts might replicate the two-task experimental paradigm from the
resource model literature with one important modification: parametric variation of the
expected utility of the second task. Our model predicts either declines or improvements in
performance on the second task depending on the experienced costs and benefits of the first
task. In contrast, only declines in performance – not improvements – are predicted by the
resource model. Already, several published studies have shown that input to a variety of
reward systems (in the form of calories, positive feedback, a gift) directly following the first
task indeed improves performance on the second task (e.g., Eisenberger 1992; Gailliot et al.
2007; Tice et al. 2007). Additional studies might test whether other forms of reward produce
the same pattern of findings, whether associating rewards more explicitly with performance
in the first task strengthens these effects, and whether parametrically varying rewards
produces systematic dose-response improvements in performance.
A second class of predictions to which our view is committed is that alternate activities one
might be able to do should influence performance. Parametrically varying the appeal of an
alternative – a more- versus less-rewarding alternate activity to the one that is being
performed – should lead to systematic differences in performance. In the limiting case,
participants performing self-control tasks without any alternate activity are predicted to
perform better than participants performing the same tasks with an appealing alternative
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(e.g., using their smartphone) available. Likewise, the well-documented decrement in
performance in the single-task vigilance paradigm should be potentiated or attenuated using
the same manipulations. Performance in the target task should also be influenced by the
expected utility of less obvious alternatives, such as daydreaming. The expected utility of,
say, prospection and scenario planning might be increased or decreased by manipulating
people’s beliefs about these activities. Our model predicts that making the benefits of off-
task mental activity salient should decrease performance on the target task, whereas making
the costs of off-task mental activity salient should increase performance on the target task.
Our model makes similar commitments in terms of predictions regarding phenomenology,
although research in this area has been limited. Indeed, in a recent review, Ackerman (2011)
noted that whereas “(f)ew studies have involved explicit measurement of changes in
subjective fatigue in the context of higher order cognitive task performance” (p. 25), we
agree with his prediction that “it can be expected that most task situations that result in mean
decrements in performance with additional time on task will also show a marked increase in
subjective fatigue” (p. 27). (We, however, recognize that performance and phenomenology
might be dissociated in rare pathological cases; see Naccache et al.[2005].) For instance,
manipulations that change performance should also change the corresponding subjective
experience of mental effort (e.g., feelings of boredom, stress, etc.). Because we claim
phenomenology drives behavior, we also expect changing phenomenology to change
performance. Positive mood inductions before the second task should improve performance
(Tice et al. 2007); in contrast, inducing feelings of boredom (e.g., perhaps by having the
participant do an easy but extremely repetitious task) before the second task should impair
performance. Blunting the phenomenology itself, for instance, by suggesting to participants
that their mood will be stabilized by a (placebo) pill (Cialdini et al. 1987), should improve
performance on self-control tasks; suggesting to participants that they pay careful attention
to their feelings might have the opposite effect. Manipulating attributions of boredom or
effort should also have an effect. Indeed, framing a task as a test of willpower, as Magen and
Gross (2007) did, might have improved performance because it changed attributions of
mental effort.
We recognize that a serious challenge for our model is that many effects in the experimental
literature are found in studies with two different tasks, both of which require self-control but
are quite different from each other. The variety of effects from one task to another is a key
feature of this literature, and it might seem at odds with a cost/benefit account. As indicated
above, however, any use of the relevant systems might be represented as a cost. In such a
case, carryover effects are possible, just as in the resource case, because related mechanisms
are used across tasks. To the extent that the mechanism (or mechanisms) that computes costs
takes as input only the fact that (some subset of) executive systems are being used, rather
than which ones in particular are being deployed and/or what they are being used for, such
carryover effects are possible. Further, as indicated above in section 3.1, persisting in tasks
steadily reduces the debt owed for experimental credit, perhaps explaining reductions in
effort.
Disentangling these accounts might be difficult. We predict that similarity across tasks – in
the sense of which executive function systems are engaged – will lead to greater decrements
in performance, but similar tasks also might show learning effects. The more similar the
tasks, the lower the expected value of the second task given a poor experience (i.e., low
perceived benefits) on the first task. Research on tasks in which subjects are at ceiling might
be of use to limit learning effects while allowing the use of similar tasks at time 1 and time
2.
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Our model also makes an important prediction regarding interventions aimed at increasing
self-control. Specifically, we suggest that self-controlled behavior is reinforced over
extended periods of time only when it is practiced and rewarded, whereas proponents of the
resource account posit that repeated exertion of self-control followed by rest should improve
performance regardless of whether behavior is rewarded. In other words, we believe that
individuals will improve in self-control through a learning process, whereas a resource
account suggests a mindless process akin to muscle building in which performance-
contingent rewards are irrelevant.
Some data from the field are interesting in this respect. O’Connell et al. (2008) found in a
prospective, longitudinal study of individuals who were trying to quit smoking that resisting
urges to smoke predicted fewer – not more – subsequent lapses in the immediately ensuing
4-hour period. That is, exerting self-control increased, rather than reduced, subsequent self-
control efforts, “providing a direct challenge to a resource depletion model of self-control”
(p. 492). We suggest that smokers who are trying to quit might construe a period of
sustained abstinence to be a victory – and, therefore, a reward that motivates further
abstinence. More generally, we predict that interventions that provide performance-
contingent feedback and/or external rewards should be more effective than interventions that
do not.
Finally, our model entails certain requirements for its neural implementation that differ from
those entailed by a resource account. A resource account predicts that there should be some
physical resource that is depleted by mental tasks, and that there is a link between the level
of this resource and task performance. In contrast, our model predicts that there should be
neural systems that can be used flexibly for different tasks, thus creating a simultaneity
problem; that tasks that feel effortful engage these neural systems; and that there are neural
representations of costs and benefits appropriate for guiding decisions about continued task
engagement. We now turn to the neuroscience evidence bearing on these issues.
4. The neuroscience of resources and motivation
A wealth of evidence from neuroscience is relevant to debates regarding subjective effort
and task performance. This section considers resource accounts and the proposed
opportunity cost account in this context.
4.1. The neuroscience of resources: The role of glucose in mental tasks
One proposal is that glucose is the putative resource depleted when effortful tasks are
executed (Gailliot & Baumeister 2007; Gailliot et al. 2007; for the related view that the issue
is the allocation of glucose, see Beedie & Lane 2012). There are, however, reasons to doubt
this account. Indeed, Hockey (2011) recently suggested that the reason that fatigue has
remained mysterious despite intense study is “the irresistible tendency to think of it in terms
of a loss of energy resources,” that there is “no evidence” for the claim that “fatigue is the
result of glucose depletion,” concluding that “there is little doubt that the energy-depletion
perspective has been a source of distraction in the search for a theory of fatigue” (p. 167).
However, because of the prominence of the idea, we address it very briefly here. (See also
Kurzban 2010b.)
Although there is some evidence that cognitively taxing tasks reduce blood glucose levels
(Fairclough & Houston 2004; Scholey et al. 2001), such results are inconsistent (Gibson &
Green 2002) and leave open the possibility that reductions are due to activity in the
peripheral systems, such as the heart, rather than in the brain. Recent reviews of the relevant
empirical work in this area have generally converged on the view that any changes in blood
glucose are unlikely to be due to increased uptake in the brain (Clarke & Sokoloff 1998;
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Gibson 2007; Messier 2004). Further, recent research using sensitive measuring devices has
confirmed that blood glucose levels do not go down when participants perform a “self-
control” task (Molden et al. 2012); and reanalysis of Gailliot et al.’s (2007) data has shown
that their inferences were statistically unsound, rendering their conclusions “incredible”
(Schimmack, in press).
This conclusion resonates with quantitative analyses of brain metabolism. Local changes in
cerebral metabolism due to engaging in an experimental task are very small relative to the
rate of metabolism at rest (Raichle & Gusnard 2002). The largest local changes in glucose
consumption (~25%) are observed in visual cortex in response to opening one’s eyes
(Newberg et al. 2005). So, if blood glucose were the resource, the visual system would be
most sensitive to performance decrements; and if nutrient consumption caused sensations of
effort, seeing would feel effortful. Further, under reasonable assumptions, the overall
difference between self-control tasks and control tasks – the inconsistent Stroop versus the
consistent Stroop, for instance – is miniscule in terms of calories consumed (Kurzban
2010a). In addition, exercise, which consumes orders of magnitude more glucose, improves
– rather than impairs – subsequent performance on tasks such as the Stroop (Tomporowski
2003; see also Hillman et al. 2008; 2009).
The effects of glucose administration on task performance are often cited as support for
blood glucose acting as a resource (see Gibson 2007 for a review). However, another
possibility is that glucose is a signal rather than a resource. Consider that glucose is known
to act on the brain’s reward circuitry, both through receptors on dopamine neurons (Hommel
et al. 2006) and indirectly (i.e., with delivery of glucose into the mouth; McClure et al. 2003;
O’Doherty et al. 2003). Further, glucose can have behavioral effects similar to that of drugs
of abuse that target the same circuitry (Avena et al. 2008). Glucose can therefore invigorate
subsequent behavior in the same manner as other rewards, and quite independent from the
calories provided (Hagger et al. 2009). Consistent with this, in the context of physical
performance, improvements can occur when glucose is only swished around the mouth,
rather than digested (Chambers et al. 2009; Jeukendrup & Chambers 2010). Indeed, recent
work shows that swishing without swallowing the glucose solution eliminates the
“depletion” effect (Molden et al. 2012).
In sum, the empirical evidence weighs heavily against the claim that glucose is the resource
on which performance on self-control tasks depends.
We know of no other explicit proposals identifying the putative resource, but acknowledge
that there are many possibilities beyond glucose. Any such theory, however, will need to
explain (1) what the resource is, (2) how that resource is depleted by effortful tasks, (3) how
depletion of the resource is sensed and leads to subsequent decrements in task performance,
and (4) why some kinds of mental/neural activity, but not others, lead to resource depletion.
This fourth point could turn on differences in architecture across brain regions, but we know
of no proposal that has identified the specific resource and the important architectural
differences.
4.2. The neuroscience of costs and benefits
Abundant evidence exists for neural signals related to the costs and benefits of engaging in
different tasks (Kable & Glimcher 2009; Lee et al. 2007; Rangel et al. 2008; Rangel & Hare
2010). Signals of exactly this type would be required by any computational mechanism that
adjusts performance in accordance with cost/benefit trade-offs.
These signals are most prominent in an interconnected network that involves the prefrontal
cortex and basal ganglia (Haber 2003; Haber & Knutson 2009). One part of this network
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involves the prefrontal cortex and a part of the basal ganglia called the striatum: The
prefrontal cortex directly projects to the striatum, which sends indirect projections back
through the globus pallidus (another part of the basal ganglia) and thalamus. Another part of
this network involves dopaminergic neurons, which are located in other nuclei of the basal
ganglia and send and receive prominent connections to both the prefrontal cortex and
striatum. Further, these prefrontal-striatal-dopaminergic loops are partially segregated. Cost/
benefit signals are most prominent in the orbital and medial sectors of the prefrontal cortex
and the corresponding ventral sectors of the striatum (Kable & Glimcher 2009; Lee et al.
2007; Rangel et al. 2008; Rangel & Hare 2010). Lateral prefrontal cortex and associated
striatal regions appear to have a different function, as discussed further below.
One prominent hypothesis is that the dopaminergic neurons encode a reward prediction
error signal, equal to the difference between the reward expected and the reward obtained
(Montague et al. 1996; Schultz et al. 1997). This kind of signal is used in computational
algorithms for reinforcement learning. These algorithms learn from experience the overall
values of states and actions, integrated over the various costs and benefits associated with
those states and actions (Sutton & Barto 1998). Although the initial evidence for this
hypothesis came from animal models (Schultz et al. 1997), evidence consistent with it has
recently been obtained with pharmacological (Pessiglione et al. 2006; Rutledge et al. 2009),
functional imaging (D’Ardenne et al. 2008), and neural recording (Zaghloul et al. 2009)
techniques in humans.
An extension of this hypothesis is that the prefrontal and striatal neurons receiving
dopaminergic input encode the overall integrated value of different states and actions (Kable
& Glimcher 2009). In other words, they encode the quantities that can be learned from
reward prediction errors. Evidence consistent with this hypothesis has been gleaned from
single neuron recording (Lau & Glimcher 2008; Padoa-Schioppa & Assad 2006; 2008;
Samejima et al. 2005), functional imaging (Kable & Glimcher 2007; Plassmann et al. 2007;
Tom et al. 2007), and lesion studies (Camille et al. 2011; Fellows & Farah 2007; Rudebeck
et al. 2008).
Though there are alternative views regarding the prefrontal-basal ganglia network (e.g.,
Berridge 2007), the debates concern the precise nature of the signals carried in different
regions. All theories share the core notion that this network plays a critical role in
motivation and reward.
Importantly, orbital/medial prefrontal and ventral striatal regions respond to multiple
categories of rewards and integrate multiple factors to encode reward value. These
properties, which allow for the incorporation of diverse kinds of benefits, from food to
social approval, are required for computing the overall benefits of task performance.
Increased activity in ventral striatum has been observed in response to primary rewards such
as food (McClure et al. 2003; O’Doherty et al. 2003), secondary rewards such as money
(Kuhnen & Knutson, 2005), and social rewards such as positive social comparison or one’s
rivals experiencing pain (Fliessbach et al. 2007; Hein et al. 2010; Singer et al. 2006). During
decision making, prefrontal and striatal activity reflects the perceived value of potential
outcomes, integrating over diverse factors such as the taste and health value of foods (Hare
et al. 2009); the magnitude, delay, and risk of monetary rewards (Kable & Glimcher 2007;
Tom et al. 2007); or the benefit to others and costs to oneself of social exchange (Harbaugh
et al. 2007; Hare et al. 2010).
4.2.1. Neural systems for effort trade-offs—Much evidence illustrates the importance
of this prefrontal-basal ganglia network in regulating the performance of tasks that require
physical effort (for review, see Kurniawan et al. 2011; we discuss mental effort below in
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sect. 4.4.2). For example, in one well-studied paradigm, animals choose between climbing a
small barrier to obtain a less desirable food reward and climbing a large barrier to obtain a
more desirable one. In this paradigm, depletion of dopamine in the ventral striatum shifts
animals’ preferences away from the high effort–high reward option (Salamone et al. 2009).
A computational account of this result and others begins with the proposal that if dopamine
neurons phasically respond to reward prediction errors, then the tonic baseline level of
dopamine in the ventral striatum would be proportional to the average reward rate in a given
environment (Niv et al. 2007). This quantity is important, because if animals are deciding
how fast to work (one measure of effort), then the average reward rate is exactly the
opportunity cost of working more slowly.
Other evidence suggests an important role for the anterior cingulate cortex (a specific region
on the medial prefrontal surface) in making effort trade-offs. Lesions to the anterior
cingulate also shift animals’ preferences away from high effort–high reward options
(Rudebeck et al. 2006; Walton et al. 2003), and the costs of physical effort are robustly
encoded in this region (Croxson et al. 2009; Kennerley et al. 2009; Kurniawan et al. 2010;
Prevost et al. 2010). Further, the anterior cingulate is well positioned to compute the overall
costs of task performance, because it responds to diverse kinds of costs, ranging from
physical pain (Botvinick et al. 2005; Singer et al. 2004) to decrements in reward (Bush et al.
2002) to social disapproval (Klucharev et al. 2009). The anterior cingulate also responds to
opportunity costs, such as what one would have received having chosen differently (Hayden
et al. 2009).
4.3. The neuroscience of executive function
4.3.1. Effortful tasks engage a prefrontal executive network—The preceding
section outlined evidence for a brain network that computes costs and benefits, and the
involvement of this network in calibrating performance of tasks that require physical effort.
Here we turn to what is known about the brain networks engaged by effortful mental tasks.
Put briefly, the effortful tasks that show decrements in performance all engage prefrontal
regions associated with executive function. Different executive function tasks all reliably
engage a network of brain regions that includes the lateral prefrontal cortex (inferior and
middle frontal gyrus), dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (superior frontal gyrus and anterior
cingulate), and posterior parietal cortex (typically intraparietal sulcus) (Buchsbaum et al.
2005; Derrfuss et al. 2005; Laird et al. 2005; Nee et al. 2007; Neumann et al. 2005; Wager
& Smith 2003). Although different executive function tasks more strongly engage different
parts of this network, the pattern of activation in executive function tasks as a class is
distinguishable from patterns observed in perception, language, or semantic or episodic
memory tasks (Cabeza & Nyberg 2000; Wager & Smith 2003).
Many of the tasks used to study mental effort or performance decrements are identical to
those used in cognitive neuroscience to study executive function. This includes the sustained
attention tasks used in vigilance experiments (Coull et al. 1998; Lim et al. 2010; Paus et al.
1997) and the Stroop and working memory tasks used in “depletion” experiments (Derrfuss
et al. 2005; Laird et al. 2005; Neumann et al. 2005; Schmeichel 2007; Wager & Smith 2003;
Wright et al. 2007). In other cases, the tasks used in the two literatures are not identical but
are quite similar. For instance, two of the more widely used tasks to elicit decrements in
performance – a crossing out letters task (“Cross out all e’s except for those adjacent to a
vowel”) and a focus-of-attention task (“Attend to the person in the video and ignore the
words”) – are similar to widely studied response inhibition and attentional control tasks such
as the “go no-go” (Buchsbaum et al. 2005; Nee et al. 2007) and attention networks test (Fan
et al. 2002).
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Other tasks used to study mental effort or performance decrements also engage the
prefrontal regions associated with executive functions. This includes tasks used to elicit
subsequent decrements in performance, including regulating emotional responses (Ochsner
& Gross 2005), suppressing a specific unwanted thought (Mitchell et al. 2007; Wyland et al.
2003), and turning down unhealthy but “tempting” foods (Hare et al. 2009). This also
includes tasks used to measure decrements in performance, such as solving anagrams
(Schneider et al. 1996), solving mathematical problems (Dehaene et al. 1999; Nieder &
Dehaene 2009), or logical reasoning (Goel 2007).
4.3.2. Engaging the prefrontal executive network entails opportunity costs—
The lateral prefrontal cortex regions engaged by effortful tasks play an important role in
“controlled” aspects of cognition. The prefrontal cortex receives input from all modalities
and, in addition to reciprocal connections to posterior regions, also sends output to the motor
system. It is therefore anatomically well situated to influence how sensory and internal
regulatory signals affect motor behavior. Miller and Cohen (2001) proposed that by actively
maintaining information such as task goals and rules, the prefrontal cortex biases the flow of
neural activity in other brain regions so that actions are affected by the behavioral context.
This general idea, that the prefrontal cortex exerts a modulatory influence over information
processing in other brain regions, forms the basis of more specific proposals regarding
prefrontal function in attention (Desimone & Duncan 1995) and language (Thompson-Schill
et al. 2005).
Consistent with this role in controlled cognition, the lateral prefrontal cortex is engaged by
an array of different tasks, spanning different cognitive domains. This is apparent at the
region level in the neuroimaging studies cited in the previous section. It is also apparent at
the level of single neurons: The same lateral prefrontal neurons have been shown to respond
to very different stimuli under different task conditions (Freedman et al. 2001; Rainer et al.
1998; Rao et al. 1997). Duncan (2001) argues that such “adaptive coding” in response to
task demands is a special characteristic of the prefrontal cortex.
The prefrontal cortex is also subject to simultaneity constraints, in that there is a capacity
limitation to the number of computational operations that the prefrontal cortex can engage in
at any given time (Miller & Cohen 2001). Although the precise nature of the capacity
limitation is unknown, our view echoes Miller and Cohen’s: “[N]o theory has provided an
explanation of the capacity limitation itself. This could reflect an inherent physiological
constraint, such as the energetic requirements of actively maintaining representations in the
PFC. More likely, it reflects fundamental computational properties of the system” (2001, p.
192, italics added for emphasis).
These factors imply that there will be large opportunity costs to performing tasks that recruit
the prefrontal cortex, given all of the tasks that cannot be performed simultaneously because
they require the same prefrontal processes. To the extent that engaging these processes at all
also requires disengaging others, such as the “default mode network” (Raichle et al. 2001),
the functions achieved by these other processes would also contribute to the opportunity
costs.
4.3.3. Other constraints: Specialization in the prefrontal cortex—A potentially
important set of observations that any theory of effort must account for is that there is
anatomical specialization within lateral prefrontal regions. Although there is significant
debate about how to best synthesize existing data, evidence exists for specialization based
on the kind of processing and on the nature of the information being processed, as well
along the anatomical dimensions of left-right, dorsal-ventral, and anterior-posterior (Badre
& D’Esposito 2009; Botvinick 2008; Courtney 2004; D’Esposito et al. 2000; Fuster 1997;
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Koechlin & Hyafil 2007; Petrides 2000; Smith & Jonides 1998; Wager & Smith 2003).
Neuroanatomical specialization is broadly consistent with the behavioral evidence for
separable components of executive control (Friedman & Miyake 2004; Friedman et al. 2006;
Miyake et al. 2000). Such specialization implies that the degree to which engaging in a
difficult task affects performance on a subsequent task might depend on the degree to which
the two tasks tap similar executive functions and engage similar prefrontal regions. This
idea, which has not been systematically explored (although see Persson et al. 2007),
contrasts sharply with the notion that carryover effects are uniform across diverse tasks that
all tap a unitary “self-control” mechanism (Muraven & Baumeister 2000).
Specialization could also contribute to increasing opportunity costs as more prefrontal
neurons are recruited to a given task. Suppose prefrontal neurons can be used for several
processes but are best suited for specific processes (by virtue of their connectivity, for
example), and the “best-suited” neurons are recruited to a task first. Then the marginal
opportunity costs will increase as more neurons are recruited to a task, because the neurons
recruited “at the margin” are less and less effective at the current task and more and more
effective at other tasks (Just et al. 1999).
4.3.4. Links between executive and motivational circuits—Because tasks that are
associated with mental effort all engage a prefrontal executive network, a cost/benefit
account requires some mechanism by which neural signals regarding costs and benefits can
modulate the performance of this executive network. Although this question has not been
widely studied, there are two potential links between prefrontal executive circuits and the
motivational circuits discussed above. These links mirror the two mechanisms discussed
above for making trade-offs regarding physical effort.
One possibility is that dopamine levels in the prefrontal cortex reflect opportunity costs,
similar to proposals regarding dopamine levels in the striatum (Niv et al. 2007). There are
direct projections from dopaminergic neurons to the lateral prefrontal cortex, and classic
studies from Goldman-Rakic and colleagues (Goldman-Rakic 1996; Goldman-Rakic et al.
2000) demonstrate that the stability of prefrontal activity is a function of local dopamine
levels. Given other evidence linking the stability of prefrontal activity to performance
(Funahashi et al. 1989), this provides one possible mechanism through which signals about
recent reward history could strengthen or weaken prefrontal engagement on the current task
(Braveret al. 1999). Aston-Jones and Cohen (2005) proposed a similar idea, arguing that
norepinephrine rather than dopamine provides the critical signal regarding the benefit of
continued engagement.
Another possibility is that the anterior cingulate cortex functions to link executive and
motivational circuits. As discussed above, the anterior cingulate carries signals regarding
various costs, such as physical effort, during reward-based decision-making tasks. The
anterior cingulate is also part of the prefrontal executive network. In executive function
tasks, the anterior cingulate has been associated with monitoring information-processing
conflicts. Botvinick (2007) has proposed that these two roles share the same general
performance-monitoring function: Information-processing conflicts serve as a negative
feedback signal that promotes more efficient task performance in the same way that various
other costs serve as signals that promote changes in task performance.
4.4. Neural changes accompanying changes in mental effort and performance
4.4.1. Neural signals related to the subjective cost of mental effort—There have
been a limited number of functional imaging studies that have explicitly focused on the
phenomenology of mental effort. McGuire and Botvinick (2010) used a paradigm in which
subjects had to switch between two tasks, judging the magnitude or parity (odd/even) of
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single digits. Behaviorally, the frequency of task-switches was associated with a greater self-
reported sense of cognitive demand, and people avoided high-demand in favor of low-
demand versions of the task when given the opportunity (Kool et al. 2010; McGuire &
Botvinick 2010). Rewards after high-demand blocks were also associated with decreased
activity in the ventral striatum, consistent with the notion that cognitive demand is costly
(Botvinick et al. 2009). Across two further fMRI experiments using this task, bilateral
activity in the lateral prefrontal cortex was correlated across blocks with subjective ratings
of demand (controlling for objective differences, such as reaction times and errors) and
across subjects with the behavioral tendency to avoid high-demand versions of the task.
These results suggest that activity in lateral prefrontal regions during demanding cognitive
tasks is associated with a subjective cost, and that this cost can motivate subsequent task
avoidance.
4.4.2. Neural changes accompanying performance decrements—Other
functional imaging studies are of interest because they examine the neural changes that
accompany performance decrements. Although small in number, the studies offer a
consistent picture: Decrements in performance are associated with decreased engagement of
prefrontal regions associated with executive function.
Three published studies have examined neural activity with functional imaging during
prolonged (>20 min) sustained attention tasks (Coull et al. 1998; Lim et al. 2010; Paus et al.
1997). All three studies found a vigilance decrement (i.e., increase in reaction times with
time-on-task) and an associated decrease in right lateral prefrontal activity over the course of
the task. This region has previously been implicated in sustained attention processes (Posner
& Petersen 1990).
Two studies have used fMRI to examine neural activity associated with performance
decrements in two-task carryover paradigms (Hedgcock et al. 2012; Persson & Reuter-
Lorenz 2010). Although the tasks used in these studies differed greatly, both reported that
activity in a lateral prefrontal region was greater when the first task was more difficult, and
that this same lateral prefrontal region exhibited less activity during the second task when
this was preceded by the more difficult initial task. Interestingly, the region of the lateral
prefrontal cortex showing this effect was different in the two studies (left inferior frontal
gyrus vs. right middle frontal gyrus), consistent with neuroanatomical specialization within
the lateral prefrontal cortex.
Several additional studies have examined the neural correlates of performance decrements
using event-related potentials. These studies have focused on the error-related negativity
(ERN), which is believed to index anterior cingulate activity related to task monitoring.
Inzlicht and Gutsell (2007) found that the ERN in a Stroop task was smaller after
suppressing emotional responses to a sad movie clip, compared with freely expressing
emotion. A similar decrease in the ERN has been observed with sustained (2-hr)
performance of an effortful cognitive task (Boksem et al. 2006; Lorist et al. 2005).
Importantly, these changes in anterior cingulate activity, like the concomitant behavioral
decrements, can be reversed by providing additional incentives for performance (Boksem et
al. 2006). Such responsiveness to incentives is consistent with the proposal that the anterior
cingulate tracks costs and benefits; it also shows that brain activity, like performance, does
not decrease in an obligatory manner with sustained effort.
4.4.3. Distinguishing resource and cost/benefit accounts—The findings in the
preceding two sections do not, in themselves, distinguish between resource versus cost/
benefit accounts of mental effort and performance. Decreased activity in lateral and
dorsomedial prefrontal regions could be due to the depletion of a physical resource
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necessary for continued high levels of activity, or it could reflect a decision to engage these
regions to a lesser degree given the costs and benefits of performance. Lateral prefrontal
activity might be associated with a subjective cost because it expends a physical resource, or
because it comes with a substantial opportunity cost – precluding any other task that would
require the same neural processes.
However, a computational account seems more likely to explain both these results and
others regarding these brain regions within a common framework. Previous studies have
demonstrated that these regions exhibit changes in neural activity linked to changes in
performance on a much faster timescale. For example, in the Stroop task, subjects are
generally faster to respond to incongruent trials when the previous trial was also
incongruent. Kerns and colleagues (Kerns 2006; Kerns et al. 2004) demonstrated that the
size of this sequential adjustment effect was associated with trial-to-trial changes in anterior
cingulate and lateral prefrontal activity, specifically (1) greater anterior cingulate activity on
the previous trial and (2) greater dorsolateral prefrontal activity on the current trial. These
results are consistent with the hypothesis of Botvinick et al. (2001) that the anterior
cingulate monitors for information-processing conflicts, which then triggers the subsequent
recruitment of lateral prefrontal regions in order to reduce these conflicts.
Note that this hypothesis has the same structure as the one we propose. The anterior
cingulate cortex encodes a cost (here, the information-processing conflicts that result from
low cognitive control), and lateral prefrontal activity and associated performance adjust
accordingly (here, activity increases and performance improves). The direction of the
changes in prefrontal activity and performance differ from our proposal, although Botvinick
(2007) has already taken the first steps to incorporate both kinds of adjustments in one
computational model. Trial-to-trial changes also present a difficulty for resource accounts in
that they demonstrate increased lateral prefrontal activity and better performance
subsequent to a difficult trial. If performance were determined only by the level of a
resource, and this resource can only go down during the task, then such trial-to-trial
improvements in task performance should not be possible.
4.5. Summary of neurophysiology
There is little neurophysiological evidence consistent with a resource account of mental
effort and performance. Existing evidence does not support the claim that glucose is the
physical resource. Effortful tasks do not reliably reduce glucose, things that do reliably
reduce glucose such as exercise improve performance on cognitive tasks, and the beneficial
effects of glucose on cognitive performance are due to its rewarding properties rather than
its caloric content (Kurzban 2010b). Although there could be other potential candidate
resources besides glucose, there is no other mature theory of the resource; in particular, there
is no theory of the resource that can explain why some kinds of mental activity but not
others are effortful.
In contrast, there is abundant neurophysiological evidence consistent with a cost/benefit
account of mental effort and performance. A cost/benefit model first requires that the brain
encode costs and benefits in a way that integrates across very different kinds of costs and
very different kinds of benefits. A ventromedial prefrontal-ventral striatal network encodes
such signals (Kable & Glimcher 2009; Lee et al. 2007; Rangel et al. 2008; Rangel & Hare
2010). A cost/benefit model also requires that there be neural processes that (1) can be used
for a variety of different tasks and (2) have a limited capacity at any one point in time. A
lateral prefrontal “executive” network fulfills these two criteria and is engaged by effortful
mental tasks (Duncan 2001; Miller & Cohen 2001). Finally, a cost/benefit model requires a
way for cost/benefit signals to influence the engagement of the limited capacity network,
and we point to recent proposals describing how feedback signals in the anterior cingulate
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cortex, or dopamine levels in the prefrontal cortex, could achieve this (Botvinick 2007; Niv
et al. 2007). This integrated proposal is consistent with the available evidence regarding
neural activity during effortful tasks and performance reductions. Lateral prefrontal regions
are engaged by effortful tasks, their engagement is accompanied by the sensation of mental
effort, reductions in lateral prefrontal activity accompany reductions in task performance,
and changes in lateral prefrontal activity are preceded by feedback signals about costs and
benefits in the anterior cingulate.
The above proposal leans heavily on existing computational models describing how these
same neural mechanisms calibrate the expenditure of physical effort (Niv et al. 2007) or
modulate lateral prefrontal performance in response to information-processing costs
(Botvinick et al. 2001), as well as on recent efforts to extend these models to the domain of
mental effort (Botvinick 2007; Botvinick et al. 2009; Kool et al. 2010; McGuire &
Botvinick 2010). Although these models are well known in cognitive psychology and
cognitive neuroscience, they appear to have had little influence on theorizing regarding
some of the paradigms we focus on here, such as the vigilance decrement in sustained
attention and the reduction in task performance in the dual-task paradigm. Clearly,
extending these models to these domains is possible, and likely to be a fruitful enterprise.
5. Conclusion
Some, perhaps even many or most, phenomenological experiences are reasonably easy to
understand from a functional perspective. The positive, rewarding sensations of behaviors
ranging from sexual activity (Diamond 1997) to coming to be valued by others (Leary et al.
1995) can be understood as the output of motivational systems designed to bring about
adaptive behavior. These positive sensations correspond in a reasonably straightforward way
to behaviors related to fitness gains. To the extent that phenomenology is understood as part
of the motivational system, driving organisms toward good fitness outcomes, many
experiences – especially the valence of these experiences – make a great deal of sense.
In this context, the phenomenology of effort presents something of a puzzle. Many of the
real-world tasks that evoke a sensation of effort lead to favorable outcomes in the long run –
persisting on difficult tasks such as writing, doing math problems, and so on – yet the
phenomenology is unpleasant rather than pleasant. Further, these sensations seem to be
systematically related to performance reductions. Why do these “good” things feel “bad”?
We have tried to sketch one sort of solution to this puzzle. The central element of our
argument is that the sensation of effort is designed around a particular adaptive problem and
its solution, simultaneity and prioritization. Because some systems, especially those
associated with executive function, have multiple uses to which they can be put, the use of
these systems carries opportunity costs. We propose that these costs are experienced as
“effort,” and have the effect of reducing task performance. This connects the sensation of
effort to other qualia, explaining the valence of the experience as a cost of persisting.
We also want to emphasize that our explanation is, of course, not wholly novel. Dodge
(1917), for example, suggested the subjective experience of fatigue had to do with subjects’
desire to attend to something other than the task before them, and the general idea of fatigue
as a problem of choosing to do what one ought can be traced back perhaps still further
(Thorndike 1904). We have similarly tried to acknowledge throughout areas where our view
overlaps, sometimes in substantial part, those of others (Boksem et al. 2005; 2006; Boksem
& Tops 2008; Botvinick 2007; Hockey 2011; Kool et al. 2010; Lorist et al. 2005; McGuire
& Botvinick 2010; van der Linden 2011).
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Finally, we wish to point out that to some extent, the literatures on “self-control” in
psychology and “executive function” in cognitive psychology and neuroscience have not
been as tightly integrated as they could be, and part of our agenda in writing this piece is to
highlight that these streams of research should be in closer contact with each other. Whether
or not our particular computational explanation for these effects turns out to be correct, some
computational explanation will eventually be required, and our hope is that this paper moves
closer to that goal.
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A schematic diagram of the proposed opportunity cost model. The expected costs and
benefits of target and nontarget tasks are estimated (top). These computations give rise to
phenomenology (e.g., qualia such as frustration, boredom, flow), which, in turn, motivates
the allocation of computational processes to tasks that are expected to optimize costs and
benefits. This allocation determines performance, on both the target and nontarget tasks. The
experienced costs and benefits then recursively feed into another iteration of the same
sequence, with continued adjustment of allocation decisions, but without depletion of any
physical resource.
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Hypothetical utilities of different actions a research participant might engage in, illustrating
how opportunity costs depend on the set of actions available.
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How hypothetical utilities of different actions might change for a research participant with
the experimenter present/absent, illustrating opportunity costs and the optimal action
changing in different contexts.
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Hypothetical utilities of dedicating computational processes to one task or dividing them
between two tasks, illustrating how opportunity costs apply not just to the selection of tasks
but also the allocation of processes among tasks.
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For the simple model outlined in the text, whether one should focus attention on only the
highest valued action or divide attention between the two best actions, as a function of the
relative utility (RU) of the next-best action and the fraction of the value (β) one gains from a
task when dividing processing capacity. These two factors determine the opportunity cost,
and it is better to divide attention when the opportunity cost is high. The locations x and y in
(B) provide an example of how to think about the dynamics of effort and performance. A
person will feel an increased sense of effort, and be motivated to reallocate attention/mental
processes in a way that reduces performance on a task, when the perceived costs and
benefits of the task move from position x to position y.
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